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Reč urednika 
 
Poštovani čitaoci, 
 
predstavljamo Vam osmi broj časopisa 
“Pravne teme“, koji sadrži 19 članaka i 
jedan prikaz međunarodnog naučnog 
skupa. I u ovom broju nastojali smo da 
pored radova autora iz Republike Srbije 
imamo i radove autora iz zemalja u 
okruženju. Neki su i ranije pisali za naš 
časopis, a nekima je ovo prvi put da 
objavljuju svoje radove u časopisu 
“Pravne teme”. Najnoviji broj izdanja 
obiluje temama koje se tiču harmonizacije 
zakonodavstva, evrointegracija, 
međunarodne saradnje i sl. Ovo je zbog 
toga što smo u ovom broju objavili jedan 
deo radova koji je prezentovan na 
međunarodnoj naučno-stručnoj konferenciji “Evroatlantske integracije – izazovi i 
perspektive” koja je u organizaciji Departmana za pravne nauke i Departmana za 
ekonomske nauke Univerziteta u Novom Pazaru, održana u periodu od 28. do 29. 
oktobra 2016. godine na Kopaoniku. Prikaz ove konferencije je takođe dat u ovom 
broju časopisa. Četvrtu godinu postojanja časopis “Pravne teme” okončava sa 
velikim brojem radova na aktuelne teme. Ono što nas posebno raduje jeste 
činjenica da je sve veći broj autora iz čitavog regiona koji sa svojim radovima 
konkurišu za naš časopis. To predstavlja potvrdu da je vizija i misija našeg časopisa 
prepoznata od strane autora sa ovih prostora. Koristimo priliku da pozovemo sve 
zainteresovane da u budućem periodu šalju svoje radove Redakciji časopisa kako bi 
sa praksom obrađivanja aktuelnih tema iz oblasti prava i kriminalističko-
bezbednosnih nauka nastavili i u narednim izdanjima časopisa “Pravne teme. 
 
S poštovanjem,                                                                               Aleksandar R. Ivanović 
Novi Pazar, 28.12.2016. godine 
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THE LISBON TREATY AND THE POLICE AND JUSTICE COOPERATION: 
SPECIAL EMPHASIS TO THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE 
Prof. dr Ivica Josifović 
Abstract: 
Criminal law at the European Union level has traditionally been dealt 
through the concept of intergovernmental cooperation and gains its legal designation 
in the Maastricht Treaty, as part of the Justice and Home Affairs. The Amsterdam 
Treaty created the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, but the Tampere Council 
and the Hague Programme took the notion of European criminal law through the 
process of mutual recognition. 
This paper is two-fold. First, the purpose of this paper is to present the 
changes in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice according the Lisbon Treaty, 
especially the Police and Justice Cooperation in criminal matters. The three pillar 
structure is replaced and the competences in the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice are increased and provisions transferred in the Treaty on Functioning of the 
European Union and within the ambit of the Court of Justice’s jurisdiction. It aims to 
answer what is the meaning of the Lisbon Treaty for the European Criminal Law. On 
one side, criminal law provisions seriously endanger individual rights, and on the 
other side, criminal law provisions reflect the basic values of society and therefore 
reserved for national legislations. However, this traditional understanding of criminal 
law is not appropriate to the European Union integration level. Having in mind these 
issues, member-states transferred several competences to the European Union in 
order to undertake measures in the area of criminal law, criminal procedure and 
cooperation in criminal matters. 
Second, the paper presents a comprehensive interpretation of the widely 
discussed issue regarding the establishment of the European Union Public 
Prosecutor’s Office. Review and answers on several previous questions are given, 
opening the possibility for establishing the European Union Public Prosecutor’s Office. 
Further, the paper makes research of the Lisbon Treaty and articles 85 and 86, as well 
as some of the issues necessary for consideration, not only from practical point of 
view, but also to reach an agreement among member-states. Having in mind that 
according these articles no such function was created, the conclusion contains several 
recommendations and directions for the perspective of the European Public 
 Associate Professor at Faculty of law, University of Goce Delcev – Stip, e-mail: 
ivica.josifovik@ugd.edu.mk.  
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Prosecutor by creating is as an independent entity with necessary cooperation from 
Eurojust. In conclusion, remarks and suggestions are pointed regarding the future of 
the European criminal law. 
 
Key words: Police, Justice, cooperation, Lisbon Treaty, European Public 
Prosecutor. 
 
PRECONDITIONS 
 
 The criminal law is an issue of particular sensitivity. On one side, criminal 
law provisions seriously endanger individual rights, not only by limitations of 
individual freedom and resulting with concrete penalty, but also with the effect of 
humiliation. On other side, criminal law provisions reflect basic values of societies 
and therefore are reserved for national states. However, this traditional 
understanding is inappropriate with the integration level of the EU and 
incompatible with the EU’s goals as an area of freedom, security and justice.1 
 The European integration to a certain extent facilitated the transnational 
crime activities. While EU was promoting the free movement establishing the 
common market and the Schengen Agreements, at the same time criminals made 
good use of it. They were able to communicate across borders far easily, make use 
of criminal legislations shortages in member-states and to avoid prosecutions. 
Under these conditions, a member-state could be a safe place for crime activities. 
Moreover, EU’s financial resources are attractive for criminals and not enough 
protected by domestic criminal law. Further, traditional mutual assistance system 
in criminal matters no longer secures efficient assets for fight against cross-border 
crime as it rely on diplomatic communications and national sovereignty with slow 
and inefficient procedures dependable on political decisions and will.  
 Since criminal law is used as an exclusive right of member-states, national 
jurisdiction rules in criminal area often overlap. This leads to a situation where 
more than one state may apply its criminal law for one same case. If an Italian 
citizen injures a British citizen in Netherlands, all concerned states may prosecute 
this offence. Such jurisdiction conflicts result in numerous criminal charges, not 
only taking time and costs, but also harmful for defence rights and therefore 
unwelcomed in the area of freedom, security and justice.  
 Bearing in mind these issues, member-states transferred competences to 
EU, enabling it to take certain measures in the criminal law area, criminal 
procedure and cooperation in criminal matters. However, the principle of 
transferred competence, respect of domestic criminal justice system and basic 
principles of proportionality and subsidiarity request careful use of these 
competences.  
 
                                                          
1 Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, OJ C 83/1, March 30, 2010 (Consolidated Versions, 2010).  
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EU’s criminal law is traditionally dealt through the concept of 
intergovernmental cooperation and for the first time legally introduced in the 
Maastricht Treaty as part of the third pillar - Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).2 
Amsterdam Treaty furthermore confirms EU’s goals in JHA area and created the 
concept of “area of freedom, security and justice“(AFSJ). As known, 
intergovernmental cooperation is criticised for lack of transparency and 
democratic deficit with minimal inclusion of the European Parliament (EP) in the 
legislation process and minimal jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). 
From EU’s perspective, the third pillar framework was never considered as an ideal 
part to correspond with the first pillar (EC). Anyway, member-states were 
concerned regarding their competences in an extremely sensitive area such as JHA. 
Shortly after the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, the Council in Tampere 
and The Hague Programme3 gave accent of the European criminal law through 
adoption of formula for mutual recognition in the third pillar. 
Accordingly, competences for regulation of the European criminal law 
belonged to the third pillar. However, the CJEU concluded that there is a legislation 
competence of the EC in criminal law if it is necessary for the environment 
protection and in order to make such legislation fully effective.4 Other cases before 
the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty demonstrated that a reform of the third pillar is 
needed and approach towards unification of pillars.5 Regarding this, several 
General Advocates emphasised the need of respect for the pillar structure 
according article 47 of the EU and to dedicate attention on international pillars as 
“integrated, but separate” legal order.6 Lisbon Treaty solves this problem with 
                                                          
2 Treaty on European Union, OJ C 191/1, July 29, 1992 (Treaty on European Union, 1992) 
3 Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions, European Council, October 15-16, 1999 
(Tampere European Council, 1999); The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and 
Justice in the EU, OJ C 53/1, 2005 (The Hague Programme, 2005). 
4 European Court of Justice, Case C-176/03, Commission of the European Communities v Council of 
the European Union, Action for annulment - Articles 29 EU, 31(e) EU, 34 EU and 47 EU - Framework 
Decision 2003/80/JHA - Protection of the environment - Criminal penalties - Community competence - 
Legal basis - Article 175 EC, September 13, 2005 (European Court of Justice, 2005); European Court 
of Justice,  Case C-440/05, Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European 
Union, Action for annulment - Articles 31(1)(e) EU, 34 EU and 47 EU - Framework Decision 
2005/667/JHA - Enforcement of the law against ship-source pollution - Criminal penalties - 
Community competence - Legal basis - Article 80(2) EC, October 23, 2007 (European Court of Justice, 
2007). 
5 European Court of Justice, Case C-105/03, Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino, Reference for 
a preliminary ruling: Tribunale di Firenze – Italy, Police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters - 
Articles 34 EU and 35 EU - Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA - Standing of victims in criminal 
proceedings - Protection of vulnerable persons - Hearing of minors as witnesses - Effects of a 
framework decision, June 16, 2005 (European Court of Justice, 2005b) 
6 European Court of Justice, Opinion of Advocate General Paolo Mengozzi, Case C-91/05, 
Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union, Action for annulment - 
Article 47 EU - Common foreign and security policy - Decision 2004/833/CFSP - Implementation of 
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simple merge of pillars. Doing so, Lisbon Treaty puts the third pillar area in the 
core of the Union and under the CJEU jurisdiction.  
 
CRIMINAL LAW IN THE LISBON TREATY 
 
Criminal law provisions in the Lisbon Treaty are introduced in articles 82 
and 83 of the TFEU. More specifically, the former third pillar of JHA is in part 4 of 
TFEU and consisting in 5 chapters: General Provisions; Policies on Border Checks, 
Asylum and Immigration; Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters; Judicial Cooperation 
in Criminal Matters; and Police Cooperation. 
Accordingly, one of the changes is the transition from traditional unanimity 
requirement in the third pillar towards qualified majority in the Council and co-
decision with Commission having the right of initiative. However, the Lisbon Treaty 
keeps the instruments of the first pillar, such as regulations, directives and 
decisions. Still, the abolition of pillar structure does not mean that everything shall 
be governed automatically through the community method (qualified majority 
voting in the Council and co-decision with the EP). The criminal law has its own 
regime with possibilities for member-states to opt-out from sensitive issues 
through emergency brake, while other member-states may proceed with the 
integration further through enhanced cooperation. Also, unanimous voting is 
required regarding approximation of criminal procedure and establishment of the 
European Public Prosecutors Office.  
Before considering criminal law provisions, accent should be put that one 
of the most interested changes in the Lisbon Treaty is the fact that the previous 
second pillar regime of economic sanctions is transferred in the JHA and by that set 
in the General Provisions. In Article 67 of the TFEU is stipulated that the Union 
shall constitute an area of freedom, security and justice and shall endeavour to 
ensure a high level of security through measures to prevent and combat crime. 
Shortly, this means that the Court shall have jurisdiction to review the legality of EU 
instruments which implemented so-called sanctions for terrorist even if they are 
                                                                                                                                                      
Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP - Combating the proliferation of small arms and light weapons - 
Community competence - Development cooperation policy, September 19, 2007 (European Court of 
Justice, 2007b); European Court of Justice, Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, Case C-
402/05, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European 
Union and Commission of the European Communities, Common foreign and security policy (CFSP) - 
Restrictive measures taken against persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda 
network and the Taliban - United Nations - Security Council - Resolutions adopted under Chapter VII 
of the Charter of the United Nations - Implementation in the Community - Common Position 
2002/402/CFSP - Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 Measures against persons and entities included in a list 
drawn up by a body of the United Nations - Freezing of funds and economic resources - Committee of 
the Security Council created by paragraph 6 of Resolution 1267 (1999) of the Security Council 
(Sanctions Committee) - Inclusion of those persons and entities in Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 
881/2002 - Actions for annulment - Competence of the Community - Joint legal basis of Articles 60 
EC, 301 EC and 308 EC - Fundamental rights - Right to respect for property, right to be heard and right 
to effective judicial review, January 16, 2008 (European Court of Justice, 2008). 
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adopted by the UN. Therefore, the issues raised regarding the limitations of the 
Court’s jurisdiction in inter-pillar conflicts, with the Lisbon Treaty shall no longer 
appear.  
 
MUTUAL RECOGNITION AND APPROXIMATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 
 
In order to overrun traditional obstacles of mutual assistance in criminal 
matters, at the EU Summit in Tampere in 1999, member-states declared the 
principle of mutual recognition of judgements as a foundation of judicial 
cooperation. Lisbon Treaty in article 82 stipulates that the judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters shall be based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments 
and judicial decisions and shall include the approximation of the laws and 
regulations of the member-states. In general, paragraph 1 of article 82, requires 
judgements issued from one member-state to be executed in other member-state 
without additional formalities. In the context of criminal matters, this principle may 
have harmful effects for individual freedoms as it leads towards recognition of 
judgements without further examination. Whether or not the preconditions for 
criminal procedure measures are met is evaluated only by the state issuing the 
judgement, while the state executing the judgement is only obligated to recognize 
and execute it according their procedural rules. 
Paragraph 2 of article 82 stipulates that “to the extent necessary to 
facilitate mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions and police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters having a cross-border dimension, the 
European Parliament and the Council may, by means of directives adopted in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, establish minimum rules. Such 
rules shall take into account the differences between the legal traditions and 
systems of the member-states.” This provision further declares a list of areas in 
EU’s competence such as mutual admissibility of evidence between member-states; 
the rights of individuals in criminal procedure; and the rights of victims of crime. 
Additionally, the article contains so-called “general clause” stressing that any other 
specific aspects of criminal procedure which the Council has identified in advance 
by a decision; for the adoption of such a decision, the Council shall act unanimously 
after obtaining the consent of the EP. Finally, it stipulates that the adoption of the 
minimum rules shall not prevent member-states from maintaining or introducing a 
higher level of protection for individuals. This is particularly important, as the 
principle of mutual recognition attracted criticism from the perspective of fair trial 
and legal protection.  
The first piece of legislation implementing the mutual recognition is the 
Framework Decision on European Arrest Warrant (EAW) of 20027, which is meant 
to simplify the long and complex extradition procedure. The EAW refers to offences 
                                                          
7 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the 
surrender procedures between Member States OJ L 190/1, July 18, 2002 (Council Framework 
Decision, 2002). 
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for which is anticipated for the person whose return is sought is accused of an 
offence for which the maximum period of the penalty is at least one year in prison 
or has been sentenced to a prison term of at least four months. The Court’s decision 
ordering arrest and return of the individual for undertaking the criminal 
procedure, executing sentence or take into custody shall be executed without 
delays within a maximum of 90 days. Basically, EAW obliges EU member-states to 
surrender its own citizens and to abolish double incrimination for list of 32 serious 
crimes. Similarities may be found in the European Evidence Warrant (EEW)8 
regulating mutual recognition of warrants for search and seizure, as well as 
transfer of evidence. The most recent project in this area is the European 
Investigation Order (EIO)9, replacing EEW and applicable on all kinds of 
investigation measures and all kinds of evidence. Where the above mentioned 
measures mainly serve for strengthening the prosecution through mutual 
recognition, the same mechanism has certain advantage also for the accused when 
applying the non bis in idem principle. EU competences go further in 
implementation of the mutual recognition principle, but also allow additional 
measures for strengthening the judicial cooperation. Among others, EU, according 
article 82, paragraph 1 may adopt measures for prevention and settle conflicts of 
jurisdiction among member-states and, according paragraph 2, EU may harmonize 
national criminal procedure rules. 
 
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 
 
Regarding substantive criminal law, EU may harmonize criminal law 
provisions of member-states in certain areas. These competences are two-fold: on 
one side, article 83, paragraph 1 of TFEU permits measures for harmonization of 
serious crime offences with cross-border dimension and stipulates that “the 
European Parliament and the Council may … establish minimum rules concerning 
the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of particularly serious 
crime with a cross-border dimension resulting from the nature or impact of such 
offences or from a special need to combat them on a common basis.” This provision 
establishes a list of crime offences for which EU shall have legislation competence, 
such as terrorism, organized crime and money laundering. On other side, article 83, 
paragraph 2 of TFEU stipulates that there is a possibility for approximation of 
criminal laws and regulations of the Member States if it proves essential to ensure 
the effective implementation of a Union policy in an area which has been subject to 
harmonisation measures. In this case the same ordinary or special legislative 
                                                          
8 Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA of 18 December 2008 on the European evidence warrant 
for the purpose of obtaining objects, documents and data for use in proceedings in criminal matters, OJ 
L 350/72, December 30, 2008 (Council Framework Decision, 2008). 
9 Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 regarding the 
European Investigation Order in criminal matters, OJ L 130/1, May 1, 2014 (Directive 2014/41/EU, 
2014). 
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procedure shall, as was followed for the adoption of the harmonisation measures in 
question.  
 Regarding directives according article 83, special legislation procedure 
applies, thus strengthening the member-states role in the Council: first, 1/4 of 
member-states may initiate legislation procedure. Second, for the rest of the 
member-states oriented on sovereignty approach, the emergency break 
mechanism exists regulated in paragraph 3 of article 83. Where a member-state 
considers that a draft directive would affect fundamental aspects of its criminal 
justice system, it may suspend the legislative and, at the end, for its legal system to 
avoid commitments arising from the draft directive. In that case, the procedure 
shall be referred to the European Council. If no consensus is reached, the draft 
directive is not going to be binding for the member-state concerned, while other 
member-states may adopt the draft directive by means of enhanced cooperation.  
Accordingly, the question that needs to be addressed in present concept is: 
What the provisions means from perspective of harmonization? Article 82 allows 
the possibility for approximation of criminal procedure if it is necessary in order to 
facilitate the mutual recognition of judgements and police and judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters with cross-border dimension. However, in article 83, paragraph 
2, the expression is partly different. First, paragraph 2 does not explicitly underline 
that cross-border dimension or crime of serious nature needs to exist in order to be 
qualified for adoption of legislation, if the area concerned previously was not a 
subject to harmonization and if such legislation proves essential to ensure the 
effective implementation of a Union policy. Further, contrary to article 82, 
paragraph 2, in article 83, paragraph 2, there is no unanimity requirement, but the 
same procedure as the previous harmonization scheme, respectively the ordinary 
legislative procedure or qualified majority voting in the Council. From where does 
this difference come from? Really, having in mind that mutual recognition is 
considered as a basic rule and considering the obvious need of basic rules in an 
area based on mutual trust, this seems somehow unnecessary. 
In any case, more interestingly, it is important to discuss the constitutional 
extent of article 83, paragraph 2. As pointed above, this provision anticipates 
legislation in an area that was already a subject to harmonization. On one side, this 
may be interpreted as a lack of repetition of paragraph 1 regarding the need of 
cross-border dimension and serious crime and that there is no limitations to this 
legislation mandate. On other side, it may be argued that there is no need to show 
that the crime in question is particularly serious or that it has cross-border 
dimension or that there is a special need for it. Still, in light of attribution of powers 
principle and analogously to the jurisprudence of the internal market, for this issue 
a Union dimension is needed – precisely for the terms “cross border nature” and 
“serious crime”, thus making the legislation at supranational level. This is 
particularly true, having in mind the consideration that the criminal law is probably 
the most sensitive area in more and more growing law of the EU. Further, from the 
internal market provisions it is well known that the differences among member-
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states are insufficient in order to sustain the attribution of powers principle. 
However, even if article 83, paragraph 2 shows certain inconstancy, principles of 
proportionality and subsidiarity shall continue to apply.  
Finally, article 84 confirms that the “The European Parliament and the 
Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, may establish 
measures to promote and support the action of member states in the field of crime 
prevention, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the 
member states”. As previously implied, it remains unclear how this provision is 
connected with General Provisions from Chapter 1, stipulating that the crime 
prevention and the approximation of criminal law represent one of the Union’s 
goals. Alternatively, article 84 simply means that the EU shall have its own crime 
prevention programme, meaning, in return, existence of criminological issues of 
effectiveness.  
 
POLICE COOPERATION 
 
The police cooperation and the establishment of instruments for 
enforcement of EU law in this area were firstly considered outside the EU’s 
supranational frame. Regarding criminal law, member-states considered that the 
maintenance of the public order crime offence investigations are areas that belongs 
to the national sovereignty and therefore were careful not to allow direct 
application of the EC law. Besides this, member-states choose to develop its own 
cooperation through traditional means of international law: they created the 
Schengen area; created the third pillar to confront with issues regarding the police 
and justice cooperation in criminal matters based on intergovernmental 
cooperation; and establishment of Europol. All these measures were, to a larger 
extent, integrated in the EU frame and came under the influence of the EU law. 
Regarding these efforts for strengthening the cooperation and EU influence, the 
member-states kept its exclusive responsibilities and competences, as it is 
regulated in article 72 of TFEU regarding the maintenance of law and order and the 
safeguarding of internal security. 
 Today, several police cooperation dimensions exist in Europe and are 
reflected in the TFEU. However, they do not have to be always clearly prominent: 
first, law enforcement authorities in member-states mutually cooperate (horizontal 
cooperation). Such form of cooperation is dominated by activities which enable 
measures in preventing and combating serious forms of crime according article 87 
of TFEU. This concerns, especially, on managing with relevant information, 
common investigation techniques related with detection of serious forms of 
organized crime and, to a certain extent, operational cooperation such as joint 
investigation teams or cross-border observations. Applicable legislative procedures 
in this area are complex and could not be identified in details. However, measures 
regarding operational cooperation needs to be unanimously adopted by the Council 
after consulting the EP. Second, law enforcement authorities of member-states 
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cooperate with Europol, a supranational police network (vertical cooperation). EU 
may establish the handling of personal information and enables it to coordinate 
investigative and operational activities carried out jointly with the member-state’s 
competent authorities or in the context of joint investigative teams according 
article 88 of TFEU. Till today, Europol does not have the competence for conducting 
investigations and operations independently, but may assist in operations 
undertaken by member-states. Third, member-states and EU raised the police 
cooperation on international level through conclusion of bilateral agreements with 
third states. 
  
ENHANCED COOPERATION AND EMERGENCY BREAK 
 
Provisions of articles 82 and 83, paragraphs 3, also anticipates the 
possibility for instigation of the so-called “emergency break” if the legislation in 
question influence the fundamental aspects of member-states criminal justice 
system. If emergency break scenario emerges, a member-state “may request that 
the draft directive be referred to the European Council. In that case, the ordinary 
legislative procedure shall be suspended. After discussion, and in case of a 
consensus, the European Council shall, within four months of this suspension, refer 
the draft back to the Council, which shall terminate the suspension of the ordinary 
legislative procedure.” It is obvious that this possibility looks attractive for 
member-states with strong connection between the criminal law and nation state 
and concern regarding withdrawal of their sovereignty on issues of criminal 
matters.  
Whether or not a member-state initiates the emergency brake, the Lisbon 
Treaty, however, secures the possibility for enhanced cooperation for other 
member-states. More specifically, paragraph 4 of articles 82 and 83 stipulates: 
Within the same timeframe, in case of disagreement, and if at least nine member-
states wish to establish enhanced cooperation on the basis of the draft directive 
concerned, they shall notify the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission accordingly. In such a case, the authorisation to proceed with 
enhanced cooperation referred to in article 20, paragraph 2 of the Treaty on 
European Union and article 329, paragraph 1 of this Treaty shall be deemed to be 
granted and the provisions on enhanced cooperation shall apply. In short, this does 
not mean that there is an obligation to “address a request to the Commission, 
specifying the scope and objectives of the enhanced cooperation proposed.” Also, 
there is no obligation that the Council is the last resort for adopting the decision. 
This anticipates two considerations. First, it is possible to argue that the mere fact 
that there is no need for member-states to indicate the requirement of last resort as 
pointed out in article 20, paragraph 2 could be seen as disharmony with the 
sensitive character of the criminal law as ultimo ratio. Second, it looks less apparent 
how the enhanced cooperation shall work in practice. There may be a risk that such 
cooperation may lead to more speeds of varying degrees. It is true that the two-
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Europe phenomenon exists, where some member-states are willing to continue 
with the integration by establishing highest possible standards of cooperation, 
especially by means of information exchange, in fight against terrorism, cross-
border crime and illegal immigration.  
 
EUROPEAN PUBLIC PROSECUTOR 
 
First previous question: What is Corpus Juris? The original model of 
European Public Prosecutor (EPP) was introduced in the Corpus Juris study 
published in 1997.10 The study endorsed a set of supranational rules for possible 
creation of European criminal law.11 The document identifies several offences 
connected on the fraud of the European budget and establishes comprehensive 
procedure for investigation and prosecution of these offences, as well as issues of 
criminal responsibility and penalties.  
 The study defines the fraud in a very broad manner covering expanding 
and taking from the budget. For the investigation, prosecution, trial and penalty 
purposes, according the study, the territory of an EU member-state represents a 
sole legal area and depends from the criminal and legal systems of EU member-
states, while the criminal acts shall be prosecuted through national courts.  
 Second previous question: What is OLAF? European Anti-fraud Office 
(OLAF) is as an independent entity within the European Commission conducting 
“administrative investigations on offences against financial interest of the EU”12, 
but with “no influence on member-states competences in initiating criminal 
procedures”.13 OLAF is competent to investigate illegal activities conducted by 
European official and economic operators when the EU budget is at stake. The first 
category refers to investigations inside the EU institutions, while the second 
category covers external investigations. OLAF’s operational activity is closely 
connected with the criminal legislation, national police and judiciary authorities.  
 Third previous question: What is Eurojust? Eurojust is established in 2002 
with Council decision for justice and police cooperation, comprised of judges, 
prosecutors and police officers from member-states competent for strengthening 
the fight against serious forms of crime.14 The establishment is inspired by the need 
                                                          
10 Delmas-Marty, Mireille, Corpus Juris: Introducing penal provisions for the purpose of the financial 
interests of the European Union, Paris, Economica, 1997 (Delmas-Marty, 1997). 
11 Kuhl, Lothar., The future of the European Union’s financial interests: Financial criminal law 
investigations under the lead of a European Prosecutor’s Office, EUCRIM 3-4/2008, p. 187, (Kuhl, 
2008: 187) 
12 Commission Decision 1999/352/EC of 28 April 1999 establishing the European Anti-fraud Office 
(OLAF), OJ L 136, May 31, 1999, (Commission Decision, 1999) 
13 Regulation 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 concerning 
investigations conducted by the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF), OJ L 136, May 31, 1999, Art. 2, 
(Regulation 1073/1999, 1999: Art. 2)  
14 Council Decision 2002/187/JHA of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing 
the fight against serious crime, OJ L 63, March 6, 2002, p. 1 (Council Decision 2002/187/JHA, 2002: 
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for mutual and efficient measures for acceleration and simplification of police and 
judicial procedures in member-states, especially through judicial assistance and 
extradition. 
 Many see the Eurojust as a forerunner of the EPPO. Still, the tasks of 
Eurojust according the Council decision emphasize its role as a facilitator: to ask 
national authorities (a) to initiate investigation or prosecution for specific acts; (b) 
to mutually coordinate when facing cross-border cases; (c) to admit when other 
state is in better position for conducting investigation or prosecution, in case of 
conflicts of jurisdiction; and (d) to establish joint investigation teams. In contrast to 
the EPPO, Eurojust is not limited only towards offences that include fraud on the 
EU budget, but also on cyber crime, money laundering, environment offences and 
organized crime. In December 2008 new Council decision was adopted with the 
purpose of strengthening the role and capacities of Eurojust in the fight against 
organized crime. Further strengthening and extension of Eurojust competences is 
enabled with the Stockholm Programme, a five-year plan with guidelines for justice 
and home affairs of the member states of the EU for the period 2010-2014.15  
  From Eurojust to European Public Prosecutor. Since the Lisbon Treaty 
is in force and created the possibility for establishing the EPPO, at least from 
constitutional point of view, according the Article 86 of the TFEU, it is normal to 
have a political will to establish such body. The EPPO idea challenged discussions 
regarding its status and institutional set up, range of competences, applicable rules 
of procedure and potential organization chart. Issues were also raised regarding 
the accessibility of the evidences gathered by the EPPO in front of the national 
courts and the judicial review of its actions. In this direction, article 86 of the TFEU 
should be observed along with the article 85 regarding the influence on Eurojust. 
 First of all, article 85 (1) of the TFEU confirms the role of the Eurojust in 
horizontal cooperation regarding the strengthening of the coordination and 
cooperation between national investigation and prosecution authorities. In this 
context, the European Parliament and the Council through regulations shall 
determine the structure and tasks of Eurojust, as well as the arrangements for 
inclusion of the European Parliament and national parliaments in evaluation of the 
Eurojust activities. Article 85 (2) stipulate that in the prosecutions and with no 
prejudice of article 86, formal acts of judicial cooperation shall be conducted by 
competent national authorities.  
 Further, in article 86 of the TFEU is stipulated that “In order to combat 
crimes affecting the financial interests of the Union, the Council, by means of 
                                                                                                                                                      
1); Council Decision 2003/659/JHA of 18 June 2003 amending Decision 2002/187/JHA setting up 
Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime, OJ L 245, September 29, 2003, p. 
44 (Council Decision 2003/659/JHA, 2003: 44); Council Decision 2009/426/JHA of 16 December 
2008 on the strengthening of Eurojust and amending Decision 2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust with a 
view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime, OJ L 138, June 4, 2009, p. 14 (Council Decision 
2009/426/JHA, 2009: 14). 
15 European Council, The Stockholm Programme: An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting 
Citizens, OJ C 115, 2010 (European Council, 2010).  
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regulations adopted in accordance with a special legislative procedure, may 
establish a European Public Prosecutor’s Office from Eurojust. The Council shall act 
unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. In the 
absence of unanimity in the Council, a group of at least nine Member States may 
request that the draft regulation be referred to the European Council. In that case, 
the procedure in the Council shall be suspended … In case of a consensus, the 
European Council shall, within four months of this suspension, refer the draft back 
to the Council for adoption.” 
 Questions arise regarding the future role of Eurojust, as the phrase “from 
Eurojust” evokes ambiguity. Bearing in mind the potential power in initiating crime 
investigations, Eurojust could transform in to EPPO according the article 85 (1) of 
the TFEU. Contradictory interpretation may result in dissolution of Eurojust if the 
competences are entrusted to a completely new institution. The insecurity in this 
language is with the purpose to leave free manoeuvre space for the creators 
regarding the consensus that needs to be achieved for the final perspective of the 
EPPO. 
 Having in mind the complexity of the issue, different legislative and 
political thoughts in member-states, it is difficult to assume that the EPPO shall be 
established by unanimous decision. Therefore, the EPPO, most probably, shall be 
established through enhanced cooperation on the basis of articles 20 and 329 of 
the TFEU. Furthermore, the Office shall perform its duties in a highly complex 
context, with different actors for coordination (national judicial authorities, 
member-states and third countries) and with the use of different legal frameworks 
(future rules of procedure, mutual recognition, agreements with third countries).  
 In paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 86 are quoted the competences and 
responsibilities of the EPPO. But, the provision stipulating that the EPPO “shall 
exercise the functions of prosecutor in the competent courts of the Member States” 
again leaves additional space for questions. First, how shall the EPPO investigate if 
it is not a part of the national police authorities? Second, does the prosecution and 
bringing to judgment means instigation of a case, demanding sanctions and filling 
appeals?16 Third, how shall the evidences be collected and evaluated and how shall 
the rights of the accused be protected? Fourth, but not the last, how shall the 
judicial review of the EPPO be affirmed (through national courts or by creating EU-
level judicial system)? From the other side, article 85 (1) explicitly refers to the role 
of Eurojust in initiating crime investigations regarding the offences against the 
Union’s financial interests, thus raising the question of EPPO’s competences  and 
shall the two institutions mutually overlap or act separately?  
 The main competence of the EPPO in the fight against offences that violate 
the financial interest of the EU, according article 86, indicates that such offences 
must also be defined in the regulation during its adoption. Also, question remains 
open regarding the jurisdiction; shall it be according the European or national 
                                                          
16 Zwiers, Michael, The European Public Prosecutor's Office Analysis of a Multilevel Criminal Justice 
System, Insertia, Antwerp, 2011, p. 398, (Zwiers, 2011: 398). 
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legislation? Paragraph 4 from article 86 make repress not only on offences 
connected with the financial interests of the EU, but also on the possibility to 
extend the powers of the EPPO to include serious crime having a cross-border 
dimension, again with unanimous act of the European Council after obtaining the 
consent of the European Parliament and after consulting the Commission, including 
the consent of those member-states that do not wish to be part of the enhanced 
cooperation, thus more and more heating the issue regarding the influence on 
Eurojust. However, if the EPPO is established through enhanced cooperation, its 
competences, most probably, will be limited on offences against the financial 
interest of the EU. Such initial restriction of the range in the EPPO’s activities, also 
could contribute in prevention of jurisdiction conflicts with national prosecution 
authorities. 
 Despite the legal basis for the creation of the EPPO according the Lisbon 
Treaty, still it is not about a completely standard procedure from several reasons. 
First, there is no commitment according the Treaty for the creation of the EPPO, 
although the possibility is stipulated. Second, it is not about common legal 
procedure that enables the creation of the EPPO, but special procedure that 
according the article 289 (2) of the TFEU, the legal act is adopted by one institution 
(the Council) with the consent of other institution (the European Parliament), and 
not as it is common in the co-decision procedure. This mean that since the article 
86 is invoked, the European Parliament cannot influence in the draft-regulation. 
Third, the procedure for the establishment of the EPPO refers to the point that not 
all members will be willing for an enhanced cooperation in the criminal area, 
because the limitations in article 86 (1) calls for consent by nine member-states. 
Since the question for establishing the EPPO is instigated in front of the European 
Council and in case of disagreement, the nine member-states may approach to 
drafting a proposal for enhanced cooperation according article 329 (1) of the TFEU. 
The special legal procedure is laboured by the fact that unanimity is needed by the 
Council, and there will always be member-states publicly opposing the creation of 
the EPPO, which means that, at the end, every proposal will move in the direction of 
enhanced cooperation. 
 Options available – pros and cons. The establishment of the EPPO may be 
summarized as a possibility for vertical judicial cooperation in criminal matters, 
with wide EU-competences or to act as a supranational body in the area of freedom, 
justice and security. Several options are possible for the design of the EPPO and its 
connection with Eurojust; also will it be a centralized or decentralized structure.  
 The first option is Eurojust to become EPPO. As regard the organizational 
transformation, the easiest scenario is to make transfer from Eurojust to EPPO. 
Eurojust may continue to function with its horizontal role and to act in the 
framework of the EPPO for the offences against the financial interest of the EU. The 
advantage of this option is excluding the possibility of competing capacities if the 
structures acted separately. The only problem in conducting this option is how to 
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adjust the vertical integration of the EPPO in the existing horizontal cooperation of 
Eurojust and the national authorities of the member-states.  
 According the second option, the EPPO may be established as a separate 
entity in the frame of Eurojust, but to function independently. In such manner, 
EPPO in organizational sense will become part of Eurojust, but the horizontal and 
vertical functions would not unite. However, if the EPPO is only a unit in Eurojust, it 
remains unclear who will perform the EPPO functions and who will be responsible 
in front of the Eurojust. The advantage of this model is that the infrastructure of 
Eurojust may be utilised by the EPPO. The risk is that the Eurojust might be 
overshadowed by a smaller entity and with a potential to be outgrown. 
 If the EPPO is established as separate and independent entity, at the same 
time using the Eurojust expertise, then this represents the most pure option 
regarding the responsibility and the internal organization, as the two entities will 
be completely separated. While the entire structure is going to be clearer if there is 
one unit for judicial corporation and other for investigation and prosecution of 
frauds in the EU, the tasks would overlap and as a result the tasks of Eurojust will 
have to be reduced with a view to the tasks of the EPPO. The risk that the two 
bodies will compete, instead of mutual cooperation, is very important and might 
create problems in the information exchange area. 
 The final scenario anticipates mergence of the EPPO and Eurojust in one 
single entity with the execution of the Eurojust tasks – cooperation and 
coordination – and the new tasks of the EPPO – investigation and prosecution. That 
will be a requirement for a completely new body with internal structure and 
decision mechanism different than what Eurojust has at the moment. In effect, 
merging would bring Eurojust to an end, and an essentially new body would 
emerge from it. 
 In all options, the creation of EPPO will have a bearing on the internal 
organization and the existing structure of Eurojust. The option in which Eurojust 
becomes EPPO will entail minimal changes in the existing structure of Eurojust, 
where radically new body emerges with the unification of Eurojust and the EPPO. 
Although, the prerequisite is the mutual cooperation, the manner this is going to be 
put in practice will depend on the compatibility of their structures. This is of 
absolute essence in order to avoid existence of the competing institutions.  
Influence on Eurojust and national judicial authorities. Regarding the 
effects that the eventually establishment of the EPPO may have on Eurojust, several 
things must be considered. 
First, the EPPO is designed to adapt a supranational character and embody 
a vertical kind of integration in its area of competences with respect on the 
member-states. Should Eurojust move in the same direction through the use of 
article 85 (1) and with powers to initiate investigations and resolve conflict of 
jurisdiction, there will be inherent competition regarding which body is more 
supranational and have bigger powers. This may cause Eurojust to opt-out 
frequently from its formal competences and, most probably, move forward towards 
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a vertical model. For the EPPO, this shall mean to be constantly under pressure 
from Eurojust, causing it to use its powers in higher level.  
Second, since the EPPO is established and competent in the fight against 
offences attacking financial interest of the EU, the powers of Eurojust in the same 
area should be adequately adjusted. As there is a higher chance that not all 
member-states may participate in the creation of the EPPO, this most probably 
mean that the priority crime area will not completely be separated from Eurojust 
competences. Accordingly, connected with the member-states that will not be a 
part of the EPPO creation, Eurojust shall keep its competences on offences against 
the financial interest of the EU. Although this looks like a clear division, the story 
does not end here, as other complications appears. For instance, which body will 
confront with cases that include member-states that participate in the creation of 
the EPPO and those that not participate? Shall that be the EPPO or the Eurojust or 
the both? Because of this reason, the EPPO is mostly discussed as to be condemned 
only on fight against offences affecting the financial interest of the EU. 
For Eurojust, the establishment of the EPPO will entail cooperation with 
another body having parallel competences, but enjoys bigger vigorous powers. 
While the sort out of the parallel competences in limited sphere of the criminal law 
– offences affecting the financial interest of the EU – seems quite complex challenge, 
still the confrontation with the challenge is possible. The same cannot be said if the 
EPPO is competently created regarding other offences. Development behind these 
lines will lead to a degree of exceeding the functions and parallel competences, thus 
making both institutions, in large scale, incapable in conducting its tasks.  
The circle of relevant actors will be incomplete without paying attention of 
the EPPO’s relations with the national justice authorities. This is one of the deciding 
reasons regarding the difficulty of creating an ideal model for the future EPPO.  
Important question in this context is how and whether the gathered 
information will circulate? Are the national authorities obliged to give information 
to the EPPO regarding a case?  What will happen with the gathered information if 
the EPPO decides not to instigate a prosecution in a certain case? Is it possible for 
the national authorities to obtain the gathered information from the EPPO for 
instigating a prosecution on national level?   
One of the most sensitive issues regarding the EPPO’s relations with the 
national judicial authorities is the judicial review of its actions? Which acts of the 
EPPO should be subject to judicial review and through which forum? Member-
states national legislations may be divided in two equal groups based on the 
judicial review of decisions for submitting a case for trial. Only half of the member-
states ask for judicial review of the decisions on pressing charges. Such review 
mostly covers formal and substantial needs, such as obstacles in the procedure or 
whether the indictment is based on sufficient evidences. These assessments mostly 
result in a) accusation, b) sending back the charges, c) stoppage of the procedure. If 
the EPPO’s indictment shall underlie the judicial review of national courts, it will 
secure higher level of legal certainty.  
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Based on the above mentioned, the EPPO’s activities may lead towards a 
proposal for direct accusatorial competences without further judicial assessments. 
Finally, it remains open the key procedural question regarding what forum will 
secure the judicial review. Should it be at European level (special chambers in the 
ECJ frame) or at national level (national judges)? From one side, such special 
chamber in the ECJ frame in this moment does not exist; from the other side, it is 
not clear whether the model of a national court reviewing decisions to a partly 
supranational body is logical in the necessary hierarchy system. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
1. The political aim must be to establish a coherent system of substantive 
criminal law, based on rational European principles. In order to conduct 
cross-border criminal proceedings within the EU, the principle of mutual 
recognition has to be re-evaluated. Only if the EU develops into a genuine 
AFSJ, where the stress is not put only on “security” but also on “freedom” 
and “justice”, then the conditions for acceptable European criminal justice 
system are put in place. Also, further improvements of judicial and police 
cooperation will be desirable and even necessary for the sake of crime 
prevention and effective prosecution within the EU.  
2. In order to create a coherent system of criminal law throughout the EU and 
on European level a rational criminal policy has to be followed. This can be 
accomplished by taking into account general principles, derived from EU 
law and acceptable to all member-states. 
3. The implementation of the principle of mutual recognition was the origin of 
an unacceptable approach to cross-border proceedings. More balanced 
approach to European criminal proceedings is needed: 
- In order to (re)establish balanced cross-border proceedings within the 
EU the position of the suspect must be emphasised; 
- All other legal instruments implementing the principle of mutual 
recognition should take into account the interests of the concerned 
individuals and the interests of the executing state.  
- Another possibility would consist in the additional harmonisation of 
procedural law. If incompatibilities between the member-state’s legal 
systems in this field were reduced, this would considerably facilitate 
mutual recognition.  
4. A better coordination of national criminal jurisdictions is needed and EU 
should take further legislative measures aiming at the determination of the 
state which shall be competent to investigate and prosecute a case at an 
early stage of proceedings. This decision needs to be binding upon all 
member-states concerned in order to make sure that simultaneous 
proceedings are effectively prevented. Finally, the criteria for the 
determination of the forum state must be defined by the European 
 
 
 
 
The Lisbon Treaty and the Police and Justice Cooperation: Special emphasis to the European...       │49 
legislator, not only on a case-by-case basis. They have to ensure that the 
question of which member-state will prosecute a case and which 
substantive and procedural law apply is no longer a matter of chance.  
5. The European Parliament is no longer a minor character in criminal law 
legislation. The powerful position especially in relation to the Council, 
member-states and the Commission offers new possibilities to shape 
criminal policy and care for a balanced criminal procedure which on the 
one hand strives for upholding public security but on the other hand 
protects civil liberties of all individuals involved. 
  The idea of establishing the EPPO is a subject of detailed discussion and 
still remains a controversial proposal with difficulties to contribute for the fight 
against frauds on EU budget. With the possibility of giving bigger competences to 
Eurojust, it could be argued that the Eurojust needs more time to demonstrate its 
ability before considering the possibility of establishing the EPPO. Having in mind 
the reaction of some member-states, it is difficult to achieve unanimity from the 
European Council regarding the creation of such body on short and medium term. 
In the absence of unanimity, a group of at least 9 member-states may establish the 
EPPO on the basis of enhanced cooperation. However, EPPO may act only on the 
territories of those member-states and in cooperation with Eurojust. 
  Articles 85 and 86 cover more questions than answers. Perhaps the Lisbon 
Treaty is a major step towards the creation of the EPPO, but as long as the issues 
regarding its functioning remain unanswered, the considerations of its 
establishment are unreal or inappropriate.  
  Besides the existence of several projects in the past over this issue, not a 
single study so far have focused on objective evaluation for the efficiency of the 
existing system for the protection of the EU’s financial interest. Having in mind the 
abovementioned problems, arguments and certain options, even the arguments 
regarding the creation of the EPPO are not completely convincible. The option that 
foresee the creation of separate and independent entity, but with the need of 
cooperation with Eurojust, so far is the best offered solution, although not perfect 
because of the different competences pointed out in articles 85 and 86. The risk 
that could emerge because of the duplication of competences may be avoided if the 
both institutions operate in its areas and according the Lisbon Treaty competences. 
The most useful scenario, but not the perfect, if the possibility of establishing the 
EPPO is achieved, whether by article 86 or by activating the enhanced cooperation 
mechanism, is where the EPPO is created as a separate and independent entity 
along with the cooperation of Eurojust. In order to avoid duplication of 
competences, it is necessary for the both institutions to operate in their own areas 
and to use all advantages of the abovementioned scenarios vis-à-vis the risks.  
  If some of the abovementioned scenarios or some fusion among 
them fails, in that case, and as a result of the existing legal diversity in the EU, the 
unique solution regarding the protection of EU’s financial interest is through 
strengthening the mutual cooperation and data exchange, not only among member-
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states, but also among member-states and EU bodies. Therefore, the EU should 
make some evaluation of this alternative and reconsider if the purpose of 
establishing the EPPO may be realized in a different way - a way that would present 
a smaller burden to the EU’s budget and member-states. 
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